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MANAGING ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE CASE OF 
PAKISTAN 
Tahir I. Shad 
Jennifer Gray Reddish 
The traditional concept of the modern political unit is a state that incorporates 
a single national community. Political development includes the process by 
which heterogeneous communal elements are gradually integrated and ho­
mogenized into a single nation (Hayes 1 93 1 ;  Kohn c 1979:36-70). Such poli­
ties, commonly referred to in the social science literature as 'integrated' ,  
rarely exist. As Walker Connor asserted, in 1 976, only twelve of a total 1 55 
contemporary states can be described as ethnically homogeneous (Connor 
1972:320).1 
Until recently, integration theorists believed that heterogeneous states were 
unnatural and inherently unstable. States characterized by social and political 
cleavages eventually would move towards greater harmony and consensus, or 
cease to exist as viable political units. Assimilation was not only the desired and 
natural outcome of intergroup relations, but the sine qua non of political sta­
bility.2 In the 1990s, however, parochial ethnic consciousness appears to have 
grown throughout the world and divisions have reappeared in new guises. 
Assimilation and increasing social homogeneity do not appear to be the 
dominant trend. 3 
The assimilation model failed to predict and to explain the dynamics of 
group relations and their significance to the structure and function of the state. 
Theorists have been unable to tell us how and why parochial identity becomes 
important at different historical moments. Why do groups separate from each 
other at one time, and unite at another? Traditional theory also fails to indicate 
when these dissatisfactions imperil the viability of the state (Brass 1 991  ). S ocial 
scientists have begun to question the validity of some of the earlier assumptions 
and approaches. 
They have outlined and advocated an alternative model in which communal 
pluralism is a legitimate, indeed the only, feasible structural option (Rose 1 97 1 ;  
Cobbon 1 969; Lynhart 1 968).4 They question whether social homogeneity or 
fragmentation are independent variables that determine the way a polity 
operates. Perhaps they are dependent variables, the products of other political, 
economic and social pressures. 
To find the answer to this question, one must re-evaluate the dominant 
paradigm in integration research. It aims to identify elite strategies and policies 
adopted to manage problems of national and political integration in heteroge­
neous societies.5 Evidence indicates that division of one sort or another is 
characteristic of most human societies. During the last decade, according to 
Huntington, communal conflict has emerged as the dominant form of social 
strife in both developing and modern societies. Few societies on any continent 
have not experienced this phenomenon, and evidence clearly suggests that its 
frequency and intensity are increasing.6 Modernization involves social mobi­
lization; social mobilization generates communal identity and interaction; 
communal conflict and violence are the inevitable result (Huntington 1972; see 
also Melson and Wolpe 1 97 1 : 1 - 1 2). This line of inquiry does not question the 
extent of homogeneity in a political system, but rather, asks how and why 
societies succeed or fail in managing conflict. 
Pakistan is uniquely suited to provide a case study. Few states created since 
World War II have had greater problems in establishing and maintaining 
authority. The history of Pakistan can be interpreted as a series of attempts to 
establish national and political integration. 
During the 1 930s, the idea of a separate, independent, Muslim state began 
to take shape in India.7 Allama Iqbal ( 1 8 75- 1 938), the poet-philosopher of 
Muslim India, is credited with conceiving, articulating, and finally selling the 
idea of a separate Muslim polity to the Muslim League leadership. Iqbal viewed 
national identity as territorial and ideological. A unified Muslim society and 
centre would be preserved through the creation of an Islamic state. He believed 
Islam would integrate the ethnically and linguistically diverse Muslim com­
munity. According to Iqbal, an Islamic community could not exist without a 
polity. 
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Iqbal' s  beliefs soon gained force in the Indian Muslim community. In 1 940, 
Mohd Ali Jinnah, at the All India Muslim League conference, summarized 
Muslim thinking of that period. Echoing Iqbal, he stated: 'The Hindus and 
Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and 
literatures. They neither intermarry nor dine together, and they belong to two 
different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and con­
ceptions' (Jamil-ud-Din 1 970:380). At the same conference, the Muslim 
League adopted the famous Objectives Resolution for the creation of a separate 
political entity within a loose Indian confederacy. As a result, a key change 
occurred in the Muslim nationalist movement in the post-1940 period. 
The Muslim League changed its objective, from securing minority rights 
within an Indian Union, towards achieving majority rights in a separate and 
independent political entity (Sayeed 1968; Hardy 1972; Hasan 1 99 1  ). Grassroots 
organizations gained momentum at the district and village levels, and middle­
class leadership was recruited to build these organizations within the Muslim 
League. Economic questions of bread and butter were included in the Muslim 
League programmes. 
In a short time, the Muslim League mobilized the Islamic population behind 
the slogan, 'Pakistan - a homeland for Muslims ' ,  promising a state in which 
Muslims could organize their lives according to Islamic ideology. 8 Wheeler 
succinctly summarized this situation: 
Seven short years after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution, a 
separate state had been achieved. The emergence of Muslim political 
separatism, the demand for separate representation, then minority 
safeguards, then provincial autonomy and federalism, and finally a 
separate state had occurred well within an adult lifetime, and an entire 
population was confronted with the psychological adjustments of the 
transition from minority to nationality. The Pakistan movement had 
appealed to diverse aspirations among the urban middle classes of the 
provinces that were to remain India, the rural aristocracy of the Indus 
Valley, and the peasant masses of eastern Bengal. There were, too, 
those Muslims - both traditionalist and secularist, who did not 
support the Pakistan idea at all, and also non-Muslims whose desti­
nies had perforce been shaped by the surge of Muslim nationalism. 
This variegated people was to give institutional form to a new state, 
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with a heritage from British India of parliamentary democracy and of 
autocracy, and at the same time, a heritage of repudiation of both of 
these. From such diverse aspirations and traditions would be built a 
state and a society in which Islam would have a definite meaning 
(Wheeler 1970:36). 
Pakistan did emerge as a bifurcated nation-state in 1 94 7, but as Keith Callard 
points out, it possessed little history of national unity. Pakistan also did not 
comply with the Western definition of a nation-state, i .e. Pakistani citizens did 
not share a common language; they did not possess a homogeneous culture; they 
did not comprise a single geographical or economic unit (Callard 1 957: 1) .  
Muslim nationalism in India resulted from the the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy; 
the fear of the Hindu majority. Throughout their struggle for independence, 
Indian Muslims emphasized their unique culture separate from Hindus (Jamil­
ud-Din 1 952:469; Chaudri 1 967; Alan 1 966). The leadership of the Muslim 
League never tried to develop a sense of Pakistani identity inside the Muslim 
community. The second nation in India was defined as 'Muslims living in the 
subcontinent' ,  a definition that did not consider the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
regional, and economic differences between Muslims living in various parts of 
India. The Muslim elite of this time, as in Iqbal ' s, assumed Muslim identity 
compensated for these differences. 
Religion, though believed to be the quintessential driving force behind 
Muslim nationhood, did not play an important role in the pre-Pakistan move­
ment, except in the revival movements of the nineteenth century.9 The Muslim 
League's  ideals did not appeal to the ulema, the religious leaders and scholars. 
'Islamic state' ,  'Islamic government' ,  'Islamic constitution' ,  and 'Islamic 
ideology' were slogans of the pre-independence era, and these slogans were 
successfully utilized to mobilize mass support for Pakistan, but no one was quite 
sure what they meant. Thus, the identity of Pakistan, except as a state distinct 
from Hindu Indian, remained vague. 
The Muslim elite did not make a serious effort to translate this 'Islamic 
ideology' into a concrete economic, political, sociocultural, and religious 
organization for the state of Pakistan (Binder 1 964:4;  Ahmed 1 983). Pakistan 
was thus a divided nation at birth, and Islam, while apparently the country' s  
foundation, could not guarantee the emergence o f  national identity. Since 
independence, ironically, Pakistan has failed to resolve this predicament. With 
the disintegration of Pakistan in 1 97 1 ,  the emergence of B angladesh as an 
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independent state marked the triumph of ethnic, linguistic nationalism, and the 
end of a major tragic phase in Pakistan' s  political history. But the problem of a 
Pakistani identity persists. 
Pakistan today contains five major ethnic groups. In number, the largest of 
these are the Punjabis, followed by the Sindhis, the Pathans, Baluchis, and 
finally the Muhajirs.10 There is also a significant 'tribal population' . Each of 
these groups is defined by a mixture of linguistic and political attributes. The 
languages spoken by the five major groups are different, and do not represent 
regional dialects. English is the official language and Urdu is the national 
language. Approximately 15 per cent of the population speaks one or both (see 
Hussain 1979). The remaining 80 per cent speak 32 different languages, and 
numerous dialects. 
The tribal population is distributed through the four provinces, but the 
greatest concentrations are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FAT A), 
and Azad Kashmir. Considerable numbers of Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis live 
outside their respective provinces. This is particularly true in ethnically diverse 
major urban areas of Pakistan, namely, Karachi, Lahore, and Rawal Pindi. 
Further, the Pathans even outnumber the indigenous Baluchis in Quetta, the 
capital of Baluchistan (Ahmed 1973:72-93). 
Levels of development of the four provinces 
Generally speaking, the provinces of Punjab and Sind are the most highly 
developed, while the other two provinces and the tribal areas are less well 
developed. Indicators of such gaps include differentials in per capita in­
come, 11 life expectancy, 12 levels of industrialization, 13 and literacy rates. Such 
gaps are widely perceived and politicized in Pakistan. In fact, the dismem­
berment in 1971 was occasioned by the perception of widening inequality 
between East and West Pakistan. 
Currently, Pakistan faces secession of ethnic groups due to lack of social 
cohesion. The most serious is the demand for greater autonomy in Baluchistan. 
Also, independent separatist feelings in S ind for the creation of S indhudesh, and 
demands for an independent Pathan state, to be called Pakhtoonistan, cause 
political tension. 
So far, however, Pakistan has appeared to reinforce national unity. 14 An 
example occurred in the early phase of the Bhutto regime ( 1972-77). After the 
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severe crisis and dislocations of 1971, the return to party competition, the 
adoption of a constitution with a federal structure, and the substantive economic 
recovery promoted by the Bhutto regime seemed to give the new Pakistani 
nation a momentum and a sense of purpose (La Porte 1973: 175; Richter 
1979:547-57; Richter and Gustafson 1980). Bhutto' s  personality also played a 
large role. Contrary to expectations, however, Pakistan, developed serious 
political setbacks after two years of Bhutto' s rule. Regional, ethnic groups 
provoked largely by the impact of economic deprivation, feelings of political 
isolation, and the pressures of regional and international conflicts, became 
unsatisfied with the status quo. 
The resulting atmosphere set the stage for a third military coup in July 1977, 
led by General Zia ul Haq. 
Immediately before the coup, unprecedented mass protests and provincial 
uprisings, accompanied by general civil unrest against the Bhutto regime, 
erupted. Also, events in neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran exacerbated the 
internal crises in Pakistan. 
The coup brought a military junta to power- and it became the most stable 
government in Pakistan' s  history. The members of the military elite believed 
they possessed the expertise to pursue development programmes, and maintain 
law and order. Neither, in their judgment, was possible under the rule of the 
politicians. For the first time, senior army officers monopolized key positions 
in the central government, as well as in the provincial governments . Pakistan has 
entered a new, perhaps dangerous, phase in its turbulent political history. These 
difficulties will not be superficial. They could polarize Pakistani society along 
ethnic, religious, and ideological lines permanently. The country' s  unity, 
security, and integrity will be seen as threatened by the prospect of further 
territorial division, unless the ruling elite makes substantial policy alterations to 
satisfy the social, economic and political demands of the ethnic groups. The 
question of national and political integration has become the key to the survival 
of Pakistan as a nation-state, in the light of the Bangladesh experience. 
The situation in Pakistan, at times, does not seem hopeful. The main 
question for political analysts today is: how do you solve ethnic conflict, while 
maintaining the state? There are many theories in political science addressing 
this question. However, which theory is best for such a task? Though most social 
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scientists have argued that Pakistan' s  problems stem from a lack of integration, 
few agree on an exact definition of the term. 
From the early sociological thinkers to the modern nation-building theo­
rists, the main question has been how and why social units cohere (Connor 1972; 
Weiner 1 966). What is it that holds a unit together? (ibid. :54; see also Moynihan 
1 993). But after achieving agreement on the problem, theorists part company on 
the definitional issue of what exactly an integrated social unit is. Is an integrated 
social unit the same as an integrated political unit? If not, how does it differ? 
There has been little agreement about how to determine whether the political or 
social unit under analysis is in fact holding together, or on how to identify an 
integrated unit in the real world. Social scientists, particularly in comparative 
politics, either pay little attention to the description of the dependent variable 
(integration), or present divergent conceptions of what integration means. 
Some writers analyse integration as a social process. Others see it as a 
condition that either exists, or does not. Donald G. Morrison et al. state: 
Integration is a process by which members of a social system develop 
linkages and cohesion, so that the boundaries of the system persist 
over time, and boundaries of sub-systems become less consequential 
in affecting behavior. In this process, members of the social system 
develop an escalating sequence of contact, cooperation, consensus, 
and community (Morrison et al. 1 972:385). 
Claude Ake also implies a process in his definition of an integrated political 
system: 'to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop 
in the course of political interaction, a pool of commonly accepted norms 
regarding political behavior and commitment to the political behavior patterns, 
legitimized by these norms' (Ake 1967:3 ;  see also Smith 1 992;Moynihan 1993; 
Brass 1 99 1 ;  Kellas 1 99 1) .  
Milton J. Esman also implies a process creating a national political com-
munity: 
The essence of nation-building, the process by which groups with 
strong, and even hostile particularism, antedating the idea of nation­
hood, and the fact of nationhood, agree to coexist and identify with 
this newer, larger entity, the nation. In this process, individuals origi­
nating in these groups transfer a portion of their loyalty to the symbols 
and institutions of the new national entity (Esman 1 966:6 1 ). 
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But these ideas do not indicate what the end product will be, nor how one 
might recognize it (Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Brass 1991 ;  Kellas 199 1 ;  Smith 
1 992; Moynihan 1 993; Stack 1986). Other scholars seem to envision integration 
in terms of a condition that either exists or does not exist.15 Karl Deutsch et al. 
have defined integration as 'the attainment within a territory, of a "sense of 
community", and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread 
enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change 
among its population' (Deutsch et al. 1966:2). 
This is called a 'security community',  i.e. a group of people who are 
integrated. According to Deutsch et al., a 'sense of community' is a 'belief on 
the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least 
one point: that common social problems must, and can be resolved by the 
processes of peaceful change' .  Peaceful change means the resolution of social 
problems without resort to large-scale physical force (ibid.). 
As an indicator of this state of community, Deutsch postulates that greater 
social contract transactions between peoples indicates increasing integration, or 
causes integration (Deutsch 1964a:46-47). But Deutsch does not stipulate the 
kinds of transactions that must be carried out, and with what degree of intensity, 
before a unit can be considered finally integrated. Nor does he state the required 
population size for these transactions, and whether or not each transaction is 
important. For example, if one measures the flow of mail as an example of 
transactions in one society, does it have the same meaning in another? Even 
where integration is rather precisely defined in operational terms, problems of 
identification and measurement remain. 
The obvious disparities between definitions of integration illustrate con­
ceptual confusion in the field. As Fred Hayward observes, the term ' ''inte­
gration" may be defined in an endless number of ways without violating the 
standards of scientific investigation' (Hayward 1 97 1  :3 16). What is needed is 
not a 'correct' definition but rather a defined set of concepts that can be 
submitted to testing. 16 
Although theorists fail to agree on a definition of integration, most writers 
concerned with nation-building in developing countries use the term as if a 
consensus existed.17 Lack of conceptual clarity has retarded theoretical devel­
opment in integration studies in another respect. Because the dependent variable 
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is ambiguous, some students of integration have difficulty establishing a clear 
relationship between cause and effect. There is as much confusion about the 
causes of integration, as there is about its definition. 
Socially relating causal variables to the integration process remains diffi­
cult. Integration in comparative studies is associated with stability, defined as 
the persistence of a lack of conflict, common experience and values, types of 
political structures, degree of compliance with governmental directives, or size 
of units. But the literature sometimes is vague about what roles variables play 
in the process or how they play it. 
The literature does show general agreement about the importance of the 
consensual attitudes and values to the integration process (Lijphart 1 97 1 :  1 - 14; 
Stack 1986). Clarification ofthe relation between consensus and other variables, 
and how they, either together or individually, determine the degree of integration 
remains undefined. The work of Deutsch and other transactionalist theorists 
illustrates this difficulty. But a connection is never established between social 
interaction and the political institutions and practices that assure peaceful 
change. 
The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attach­
ment to the same set of values, without the sense of community that leads to 
political integration. The sense of community that is relevant to integration turns 
out to be mutual sympathy and loyalties of 'we feeling' ,  of trust and mutual 
consideration. Partial identification in terms of self-images and interests, of 
mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action also 
forge national identity. 'Peaceful change' could not be assured without this kind 
of relation (Deutsch et al. 1966: 1 7). Deutsch and his collaborators are saying 
that in units where there is frequent interaction between people, people come to 
like each other, and the unit is integrated. In other words, mutual liking has a 
direct correlation to frequency of contact. 
This proposition assumes that social learning takes place in one direction 
only, and leaves out other possible intervening variables that may determine 
whether or not people share a 'we feeling' .  Increased communication, for 
example, in a situation of economic scarcity, may provoke antagonistic rather 
than cooperative attitudes among the majority. Increased communication may 
also reflect conflict, not peaceful exchange (Cantori and Spiegal 1 973 :480-81 ; 
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see also Hechter 1 986). It is difficult, therefore, to use transition analysis as 
either a describer or predictor of political integration in Deutsch' s sense, unless 
the logical steps between the two processes are concretely defined. 
Theorists also have had difficulty distinguishing the factor chosen to 
explain how integration occurs from the definition of integration itself. Does a 
high positive pattern of transaction flow, in the Deutschian model, in some way 
facilitate integration, or does it indicate that integration has, to some extent, 
already taken place? (Bull 1 966:373-75). Deutsch holds that both propositions 
are true (Jacob and Teune 1 964:23 ; Haas. 1 964:27). B ruce Russett has made a 
similar statement (Russett 1 963 :33). But if this is so, then Deutsch' s definition 
of integration is empirically tautological, since variables used to indicate the 
state of integration also serve to explain the process. Transactions are caused by 
a pre-existing consensus, and transactions cause consensus that leads to integra­
tion. 
This confusion between explanatory and definitional variables also ex­
plains why integration does, or does not, exist. Jacob and Teune, for example, 
define integration as follows: 
Political integration generally implies a relationship of community 
among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held 
together by mutual ties of one kind or another, which give the group a 
feeling of identity and self awareness.  Integration, therefore, is based 
on strong cohesiveness within a social group; and political integration 
is present when a political governmental unit of some sort is cohesive 
(Jacob and Teune 1 964:4). 
In their listing of ten factors explaining the presence or absence of integration, 
'homogeneity' seems to be tautological: 'The hypothesis is that social homo­
geneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of political integration, and, 
conversely, that communities, whose members are very different from one 
another, will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining political integration' 
(ibid.: 1 9). 
Attitudes and values are indicators of social homogeneity, along with race, 
religion, language, and ethnic identification. 'Similarity of people' s  expressions 
of social distance toward one another, and towards persons and groups outside 
their community, is taken as evidence of a feeling of social homogeneity' 
(Morrison et al. 1 972:385). Feelings of identity indicate integration, and a 
feeling of social homogeneity causes integration. 
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In addition to the problems of definition and conceptualization, there is the 
problem of operationalization. In other words, how and by what means should 
integration be measured? For example, comparative politics has emphasized 
state-wide values consensus as essential to integration. But the question of 
which values must be nationalized in order to achieve integration, has never 
been satisfactorily answered. What values does the researcher measure? What 
sorts of parochial identities, and how many, are relevant to the process? Are 
there various types or degrees of consensus that vary over time? Are all 
substantial loyalties inimical to the integration process? The problem is best 
illustrated by the operational methods followed by Donald Morrison and his 
collaborators in Black Africa (ibid.). They define integration as a process 
whereby citizens develop linkages and cohesions that strengthen the boundaries 
of the system and weaken those of the subsystems. 
It also presupposes that language, religion, or ethnic groups are homoge­
neous and unchanging in their values and orientations. But existing research 
shows that differential value orientations exist within communal groups, and 
that system-wide loyalties are mobilized at certain times, while parochial 
loyalties are predominant at others. It also suggests that even the content of these 
identities changes over time (Syed 1 982;86- 1 1 1 ;  see also Kellas 1 99 1 : 1 1 7-34). 
The problem, then, in integration theory stems from the fallacy of the 
'misplaced level' .  1 8  Social scientists have inferred characteristics of the total 
system from the assumed identity of the individuals within groups. In other 
words, they have deduced that a system' s  integration is related to the existence 
or non-existence of particularistic groups, and in turn have attributed permanent 
attitude and behavioural characteristics to individuals. Integration theorists thus 
make inferences that may or may not be correct about units of analysis that are 
lower and higher than the observed groups, without establishing logical link­
ages between them. Where there are strong parochial groups, a system will be 
less integrated and the individuals will have a weak sense of national identity. 
But it is an error in logic to infer from the observed fact that disparate groups 
exist in a society, that a political system is not integrated, or that all the 
individuals in those groups share the same political attitude. Persons from the 
same group occupy different positions in society and in the group. They find 
themselves living in different contexts, and those which may have a stronger 
influence on their attitudes and behaviour than membership in a primordial 
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group. In times of war, economic distress, or governmental crisis, identities may 
undergo change. 
Determining the relation between systemic and individual behaviour re­
quires knowing not only that primordial identities exist, but also the conditions 
that make them relevant to the effective functioning of the state. Primordial 
identities should be viewed as fluid, not static. These identities may even be as 
much a response to the realities of the larger political system as they are to the 
demands of primary group allegiances. As the context in which interaction takes 
place between people and the political regime changes, the perceptions of 
individuals about themselves, in relation to others and to the state, evolve as 
well. Parochial identities also may be dysfunctional to the operation of the larger 
political system in one context, and not in another. They may be stronger in one 
political situation than in another. As Aristide Zolberg has stated, perhaps the 
term 'integration' should refer to 'a shifting relationship between changing 
identities within the framework of a variety of possible political arrangements, 
capable of coping with a specifiable range of stresses' (Zolberg 1 967:45 1 -52;  
see also Stack 1 986: 13-24; Moynihan 1 993; Brass 1 99 1 ;  Kellas 1 99 1 ). 
The inability of integration theorists to agree on a general concept of 
integration precluded their agreement on which variables in the real world 
represent what it is they want to describe and explain, and how to measure it. 
Each theorist is proceeding along separate lines of investigation, and there is 
little synthesis between them. Upon close examination of the literature, two 
related, normative implications thread their way though the various approaches 
and conceptual frameworks. First, there is the predisposition towards consensus 
and shared values, which are equated with a form of national identity, or national 
political consensus. Secondly, there is an aversion to force and coercion as 
integrative measures; authoritarian regimes are often left out of analysis. 
Researchers have argued that integration can exist only in the absence of violent 
conflict, where there is an inner coherence or equilibrium of values on a 
state-wide scale that makes the use of force unnecessary. Leonard Binder' s 
definition of national integration is a good example of social scientists' thinking 
on this question: 'national integration requires the creation of a cultural, 
ideological consensus of a degree of comprehensiveness that has yet not been 
seen in the developing countries' (Binder 1 964:630; see also Brass 1 99 1 ). Of 
course, the absence of violent conflict does not automatically mean that 
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comprehensive consensus exists, especially when the absence of violence is the 
result of decapitation and coercion by the state. 
This conception is  similar to the argument that in order to achieve consensus, 
social cleavages must be eliminated, or neutralized. It is assumed that a common 
core of values requires either an ethnically homogeneous unit, or one in which 
cleavages are numerous and crosscutting, which might reduce the possibility of 
serious conflict between groups. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Ros berg's  ideas 
on territorial integration illustrate this line of reasoning. As they state, the 
process is 'the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and 
discontinuities on the horizontal plane, in the process of creating a homoge­
neous, territorial, political community' (Coleman and Rosberg 1 964:9).19 
The association of integration with national political consensus, it can be 
argued, is an association of integration with democracy. Common to these 
conceptions is the association of integration, not just with the nation-state as 
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Cynthia Enloe has obseived (Enloe 1973:261-74; see also Horowitz and 
Bennett 1978:165), but with the stable, democratic, nation-state. Democratic 
theory holds that attitudinal consensus is a prerequisite to the functioning of a 
stable democratic system. Particularistic loyalties indicate a high probability of 
intergroup conflict, and unity can be achieved only through coercion or force. 
Force and coercion are seen to be undemocratic means of attaining unity.2() 
The democratic implications of integration theory are best illustrated by the 
2x2 matrix above. In spite of other inteivening variables that students of 
integration consider important to the integration process, their theories assume 
one kind of identity consensus or another as a precondition for the kind of 
political system that evolves. Until recently, the model in Box 2 represented the 
political scientists' conception of an integrated state. Political science has 
tended to reflect two variations of one model of national integration: a demo­
cratic assimilationist version, and a democratic pluralist version.21 
The primary concern has been to determine, not 'whether cultural unity is 
a necessary or sufficient condition for political unity' (Rabushka and Shepsle 
1979:18), but whether it is a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic 
political stability. But this implies that non-democratic polities are less inte­
grated and less stable. James M. Malloy has argued that authoritarian regimes 
are potentially viable modes of organizing development effort (Malloy 1977 :3-
4; see also O'Donnell 1978:6). Lijphart added a third national integration model 
with his consociational democracy (Box 1). He takes exception to other 
integration theories, not because of their concern with stability and democracy, 
but because he believes that a society segmented by strong, particularistic 
loyalties can also be democratically ruled. He contends that Box 2 and Box 1 can 
produce stable democratic systems. 'Political stability can be maintained in 
culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of subcultures engage in cooperative 
efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation (Lijphart 
1971:11). 
Lijphart also introduces an inteivening political variable, 'conscious co­
operation', among elites drawn from all major social groups willing to control 
ethnic competition, and willing to accept the principle of the right of political 
autonomy for other subcultures. This kind of system gives legitimacy to paro­
chial loyalties, but also requires an overlay of ideological national consensus. 
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Particularistic groups are incorporated into the larger political system by giving 
each a stake in the perpetuation of the system, thus producing a national political 
culture in the form of what Lijphart calls 'moderate nationalism' (Lijphart 
1968:29-30). 
Even with Lijphart's amendment, the presence of factional groups is still 
linked with a lack of loyalty to a central regime, a condition that can be 
ameliorated by a particular form of consensual behaviour of elites and citizens. 
The term 'integration' remains associated with states that control populations 
with some sense of national identity, which in tum is still considered a 
prerequisite of stability and democracy. B asically, integration is conceived as 
a co-variant process of gradually increasing national and political consensus, 
along with the growth of democratic political institutions and stability. 
Dismissed from the lexicon of integrated states are those in the second 
vertical column (Boxes 3 and 4 ). These societies contain groups with little sense 
of national identity, and are associated with lack of consensus, authoritarianism, 
and a degree of instability. A pluralistic society (Box 3), for example, as 
described in Fumivall, is one in which primary individual loyalties remain with 
the communal group (Furnivall 1939, 1956). Various groups may reside side by 
side in the same political system, but as Leo Kuper has stated: 
Integration rests on common values, and common motivations at the 
individual level. It presupposes cultural homogeneity. Cultural diver­
sity or pluralism, automatically imposes the structural necessity for 
domination by one of the cultural sections. It excludes the possibility 
of consensus, and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group 
relationships. This implies a distinction between two basic types of 
society, integrated societies characterized by consensus and cultural 
homogeneity, and regulated societies characterized by consensus and 
cultural pluralism (Kuper 1969: 1 1). 
One could argue that the assumptions on which the pluralistic society rests 
are the same as those of the two integration models. A society with high 
subgroup identity and low central identity would have difficulty in being 
democratic, or integrated, since it is force, rather than consensus, that maintains 
the system. 22 
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The absence of loyalty either to subnational groups or to the central state is 
characterized by other theorists as a mass society (Box 4 ). Hannah Arendt 
argues that an atomized society with an alienated population is particularly 
vulnerable to totalitarian movements and regimes. The term 'masses' refers to 
people who no longer are identified with either parochial interest groups or the 
prevailing regime, to people 'who cannot be integrated into any organization 
based on common interest, into political parties or municipal government or 
trade unions '  (Arendt 1 95 1  :305; see also Kornhauser 1959). Thus, subnational 
loyalties and atomization are associated with a lack of national consensus, non­
democratic forms of government, coercion, and instability. Theorists also argue 
that societies categorized in this fashion represent various forms of disintegra­
tion. 
But integration may be a more complex, multilinear process than existing 
integration models reveal (Verba 1 967: 1 1 3). Taking place on different socio­
political levels, proceeding at different rates of intensity, integration appears to 
be a fluctuating process, responding at different times to different contexts and 
environments. At this stage of theory, integration need not refer to a known end 
state, but to a process of changing relations and identities within a variety of 
possible political arrangements (Zolberg 1967:452). Integration, as a multilinear 
phenomenon, implies that there can be degrees of cohesion at many different 
levels. At certain times in a people' s history, a significant proportion of the 
members may, on some issues, identify with groups beyond the boundaries of 
a province, and on other issues, with citizens of the province in which they 
reside. The socio-political arrangements of the political unit may change in 
response to challenges to its structure, and the strategies used to achieve 
integration may differ, but the political unit that can regulate its affairs 
effectively is,  by definition, considered integrated. 23 
Another theoretical problem with integration literature is the absence of a 
comprehensive examination of the global environment as a possible causal 
factor of integration. 24 In general, international systemic factors have not been 
considered important independent, or intervening, variables in the integration 
process. 
Some writers have argued that perceived political danger to a society' s  
survival tends to increase identification with the nation-state. As Lijphart has 
explained: 
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My comparative analysis of five consociational democracies shows 
that a strikingly favorable factor in the establishment or strengthening 
of consociationalism is the existence of a foreign threat. In all five 
countries, overarching cooperation among the subcultural elites was 
either initiated, or significantly extended, during the periods of inter­
national crisis, especially during the First and Second World Wars; 
and in most cases, these changes proved quite durable (Lijphart 
1971:14). 
But Lijphart himself takes note of the disparity between his findings and 
those of Deutsch. In Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch 
et al. specifically exclude external factors as important to the integration 
process, dismissing the effects of foreign military threats as neither strong nor 
positive. Even when they were positive, Deutsch finds that 'their effects were 
transitory' (Deutsch et al. 1966:44-45; see also Smith 1992). 
Even if this interest in the positive effects of outside threats is seen as a sign 
of modest progress in conceptualization, integration theorists still devote 
minimal attention to outside states, or to other factors in the international 
environment. The neglect of these factors in integration theory is problematic, 
given the large amount of attention writers on international relations are 
devoting to models of interdependence, to the increasing interpenetration of 
states, and to linkages between domestic and foreign affairs. 
Once one examines the theoretical literature concerning integration, one 
can then begin to apply it to a case study, such as the increasing ethnic conflict 
in Pakistan. As noted earlier, Pakistan' s  internal havoc threatens to disintegrate 
the state. What ideas may be taken from the literature and applied to this case? 
To answer this question, one must examine Pakistan' s  integration strategies 
under both the civilian and military regimes. 
The case of Pakistan 
The breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was not caused solely by the rise of Bengali 
ethnic nationalism, but also by Indian support - with Soviet backing - of 
the liberation forces in East Pakistan. In this case, it could be argued that an 
analysis is not possible without taking into consideration the external envi­
ronment (see Choudhury 1973:231-32; Dunbar 1972:447-53; B hutto 
1972:27). Thus, one must make a small attempt to redress that weakness, by 
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comparing civilian (democratic) and military (authoritarian) elite strategies to 
achieve national and political integration in Pakistan, in the post- 1 97 1  pe­
riod. 25 
No social or political formations are 'self-regulating' ; they must be gov­
erned. The more intense the crisis of national and political integration, the more 
skilled the attentive elites must be in their governance. The alternative is that the 
political structure will erupt into violence and disintegrate. Pakistan experienced 
this in 1 97 1 .  It is therefore important that studies of national and political in­
tegration examine elite strategies for the management of ethnic conflict, the 
institutions and practices through which ethnic conflict can be mitigated and 
controlled by action of public authority. The concern here, then, is with the 
stategies and instruments of public policy, which bring such conflict under 
control. 
Civilian and military attentive elites play a critical role in the process of 
national and political integration; they alone can make a direct negative 
contribution. The major task of all regimes, whether military or civilian, is to 
attain control and legitimacy. These needs underlie elite strategies (civilian and 
military) for achieving national and political integration. The analysis of the 
military in developing countries has been organized around two themes. 
Chronologically, the first concern is to explain military intervention, particu­
larly in the form of coups. Increasingly, the trend has been to analyse the 
consequences of military rule. The trend now is to evaluate the performance of 
the military as a ruling elite: the military' s ability to maintain stability, create 
political institutions, achieve economic development and national integration. 
Some writers on the military have argued that the military institutions of 
developing nations serve to submerge ethnic tensions. Empirically, this line of 
reasoning has not held up (Pinkney 1 973 : 1 60; see also Luckham 1 970:60-62). 
Ethnic representation involves decentralization of authority; military regimes, 
however, tend to focus on centralization of power and authority. Military 
regimes place greater emphasis upon the need for control, stressing the values 
of political order and stability. 
Civilian (democratic) governments, on the other hand, require more popular 
support for their survival, and are forced to place more emphasis on gaining 
legitimacy. Democratic governments usually have interdependent relations 
with a network of civilian organizations and, under normal circumstances, 
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ruling civilian elites do not want to endanger their power base by upsetting too 
many ethnic groups through the use of coercion (Cohen 1976:235). 
Therefore, it could be argued that democratic civilian elites will be less 
coercive, more representative, and will rely on economic distraction as well as 
symbol creation strategies to achieve integration. For example, the civilian 
elites in India have granted state autonomy to linguistic and regional commu­
nities, and have rarely relied on coercion (Gupta 1 970a). 26 
This contrasts with the unwillingness of the military elites in Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan to address ethnic groups' demands (Dikshit 1976; Hatch 
1 970; Whiteman 1 970; Farer 1976; Gutteridge 1 975:22). The negative attitude 
of the military towards political bargaining, compromise, and accommodation 
of ethnic groups is well documented in the literature on the military (Janowitz 
1 964; Lissak 1 976:3 1 ; Nordlinger 1 977: 153-54; Welch 1970:47). Indeed, the 
style of the Pakistani military elite and its emphasis on political order has been 
likened to that of the former colonial regimes (Cohen 1 984: 1-3 1 ;  see also 
Hussain 1 976:927; Pye 1 962:246). Unlike the civilian elite that attempts to 
mediate inter-ethnic conflicts and develop consensus, the military elite has tried 
in an authoritarian manner to balance ethnic, social, and political forces against 
each other, thereby achieving a 'forced cohesion without consensus'. Moreover, 
it has been argued that military elites are more narrowly based ethnically than 
are civilian elites, and that they tend to promote the interests of their own ethnic 
groups and regions (Finer 1 974:6).27 
We also need to identify the type of military regime that we are trying to 
analyze. S.E. Finer identified five different types of military rule, according to 
the extent to which the military controls the major policies of a society, and the 
degree of overtness with which it does so. Finer' s five types include: ( 1 )  indirect 
limited military rule, (2) indirect complete rule, (3) dual rule, (4) open direct 
military rule, and (5) quasi-civilianized direct military rule. For the purpose of 
this study, the military regime in Pakistan can be identified as 'open, direct 
military rule' (ibid.). 
The research involves a case study comparing civilian and military elite 
strategies to achieve national and political integration. 'Integration' can be 
viewed as a measure, not of social homogeneity, but of the ability of a political 
unit to conduct its important and necessary business without alienating large 
numbers of its constituents (so they are no longer willing to have their affairs 
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regulated, or to participate in the particular unit). Such a definition allows the 
focus to shift to the role of various internal institutions and groups - such as 
national elites, subnational elites, government and religion- in alienating or 
accommodating important parts of a population in a complex heterogeneous 
society such as Pakistan. 
The time frame selected for this paper is a 35-year period, 1 947-82. This 
time frame gives us a unique opportunity to compare civilian elite strategies for 
integration ( 1 947-58 and 1 972-77) and military elite strategies ( 1 958-7 1 and 
1977-82); it also enables one to compare a freely elected democratic regime's 
strategy for integration ( 1 972-77) to that of an authoritarian military regime 
(1 977-82). 
The civilian regime that came to power in 197 1  was democratic in the sense 
that power was relatively diffused between core elite and subnational elite, 
interest groups were functioning competitively, and bargaining, rather than 
coercion, was the principal instrument for regulation of ethnic conflict. On the 
other hand, the authoritarian military regime that came to power in 1 977 de­
emphasized open and competitive politics ; political power was centralized, and 
the military, supported by retired army officers, dominated the decision-making 
process.  Several aspects unique to these three periods will be addressed in this 
paper. 
First, one must examine the civilian periods of the regime from 1 972 until 
the military takeover in 1 977. What was the political ideology of integration for 
the Pakistani civilian elite? What did the civilian elite see as its objective with 
regard to national and political integration? A civilian government' s  ideology 
also plays a key role for the state. However, do the objectives of the ideological 
strategy depend upon the objectives of the elite? Is it constrained by relative 
resources, demographic, organizational, technological, and economic, at the 
disposition of competing or co-existing ethnic groups? 
One must also examine the types of policies and instruments developed by 
the civilian elite to achieve its national and political integration goals. What was 
the predisposition of the subnational or counter-elites to these policies during 
the populist period? Lastly, one must examine the success of these civilian 
strategies, policies and instruments in forging political and national integration 
among the population at large. 
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The same theoretical strategy is used to examine the military regime that 
took power in 1977. Again, the political idiom of integration is questioned. Did 
the military view its objectives with regard to national and political integration 
in Pakistan? 
One also must question the ideological predisposition of the authoritarian 
military regime in the anti-populist period. What types of policies and instru­
ments were developed and used by the military elite to achieve its national and 
political integration strategies? What was the predisposition of the subnational 
or counter-elites to these strategies and policies? 
As with the civilian regime, one then analyses the military strategies, 
policies, and instruments used to create a sense of national and political 
integration among the Pakistani population. This analysis is applied at the 
provincial and the national level, using Richard Cottam' s checklist as a guide 
(Cottam 1979) 
At the provincial level, one first examines the attitude of the attentive elite. 
Is there a sense of Baluch, Pathan, Punj abi, and Sindhi sentiment among the 
attentive elite in these provinces? What idiom does the elite have with regard to 
Baluch, Sindhi, Pathan, and Punjabi identity and nationality formation? 
One then questions the capability and viability of these ethnic groups. Do 
these factions have the capability to achieve statehood? One must take into 
consideration the ethnic groups' population size, territory, and economy (Fuller 
1993: 108). For instance, does a two-person ethnic group deserve its own 
country? Does a country need a viable economy to survive? 
Another question at the provincial level concerns that of the uniqueness of 
the ethnic group. What separates an ethnic group from another? What comprises 
Baluch, Pathan, Sindhi, and Punjabi identity? A 'unique' people will share a 
common history, culture, and preferably, language. Religion, race and ethnic 
commonalities also play a distinct role. The Israelis trace their roots to their 
exodus from Egypt in search of the promised land. African-Americans share a 
common history as well. One might also argue that language and homogeneous 
racial characteristics make the Japanese a distinct group. 
However, once a group is defined ethnically, its political strength is 
measured. For Pakistan, one measures the number of registered voters in each 
province, membership in parties, voter turnout in the general elections of 1970, 
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and the degree of literacy. The second level of analysis occurs at the national 
level, concentrating on the civilian and military elite. First, one examines the 
attitude of the attentive elite. Is there a sense of 'Pakistan' among the civilian and 
military elite? How do they conceptualize Pakistan' s  national identity? What is 
the level of political awareness among this elite? To what extent does the elite 
identify with the nation of Pakistan? How receptive has the population at large 
been to civilian and military elite strategies for integration? Lastly, one must 
estimate the expectations Pakistan' s  population have of life together as Paki­
stanis. Are they comfortable with each other and do they share a common 
history, culture, and language? Do they have a sense of emotion about Pakistan? 
In order to ascertain the uniqueness of the population, one analyses its culture, 
language and history. With these levels of analysis in mind, one then can 
produce some integration strategies. 
There are two broad types of state strategies and institutional arrangements 
to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups.  A strategy of national inte­
gration is one that seeks assimilation of the entire population of a state to a 
common identity, and that recognizes only individual rights, privileges, and 
duties (Akzin 1964: 66, 76-111; see also Brass 1991; Smith 1992; Moynihan 
1993; Kellas 1991; Stack 1986). Such a strategy is to be distinguished from one 
of political integration, which seeks only to maintain the cohesion and territorial 
integrity of a political unit, but does not necessarily demand cultural assimila­
tion of diverse groups to either a dominant or composite culture (Weiner 
1966:555; see also Gupta 1970b:39-51 ) . A strategy of pluralism recognizes the 
existence of differentiated groups in a population, and concedes rights, privi­
leges, and obligations to groups and individuals. 28 
Both strategies of national integration and pluralism may be promoted in 
more or less accommodating and egalitarian ways. Integration strategies may be 
liberal and egalitarian, or they may amount to forced assimilation of minorities 
into a common mould. Pluralist strategies may recognize all differentiated 
groups as equal, or they may discriminate among groups, treating members of 
some as superior or full citizens, and others as inferior, or not entitled to full 
citizenship. 
One expects that some patterns will emerge with regard to integration 
strategies, when we compare the civilian regime to the military regime. The 
ideological predisposition, idioms and goals involved in the integration of the 
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civilian and military elite will determine the strategies chosen, and will at the 
same time be constrained by the relative resources - demographic, organiza­
tional, technological, and economic - at the disposal of the subnational groups. 
Although an infinite number of strategies for integration can be generated, 
almost all of them can be classified under three headings. 
The first integration strategy concerns coercion. The state deprives the 
population of material resources and political power. When Lithuania attempted 
to break from the USSR in the late 1 980s, the state withheld oil supplies. A 
threatening leader of a counterpolitical group is killed or exiled, decapitating the 
deviant group' s  political power. One could argue that the assassination of the 
Reverend Martin Luther King was linked to such a plan. The state may institute 
coercive language policy - the United States expects each citizen to learn 
English, for instance. Also, the state apparatus may attempt to keep the 
counterpolitical group depolarized - the Kurds are separated between three 
countries. 
The second method of integration occurs under a utilitarian regime. The 
government attempts to co-opt its population with concessions to rebellious 
groups. For instance, the United States ended segregation during the 1960s after 
African-Americans began to revolt against their oppressive conditions. This 
action by the US government co-opted the oppressed population by granting 
them political power and redistributing some of the wealth in their direction. A 
utilitarian government may attempt to institute a liberal language policy. 
S ingapore is an example of such a country. 
A third strategy for the government is normative action. The normative 
government will create symbols (a national flag, national hero, national holi­
days) and propaganda; it will maintain the efficacy of the law as well as a 
national or official language. 
These strategies are not exclusive. Regimes often follow a combination of 
the three. Both the strategies and policies of regimes may change over time, as 
the relative resources and aspirations of subnational groups shift and original 
choices prove to be ineffective, or too costly.29 
One must also examine the effects of the strategies on ethnic relations. 
Which strategy is more effective, or do any of them work at all? There are three 
policy areas which greatly affect ethnic relations: the institutional, the cultural, 
and that of resource distribution. 
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An institutional mechanism that promotes positive relations is the granting 
of local autonomy, and its obverse often results in alienation and unrest. In the 
cultural area, language is a major source of conflict between ruling elites and 
ethnic groups, when the dominant or a minority group's language is made the 
only language for education and government administration. Problems arise in 
the area of resource distribution when the members of an ethnic group perceive 
that they are not receiving equitable treatment, whether in regard to material 
resources or government and military employment. 
The likelihood of implementing policies that would ameliorate ethnic 
relations, and the degree to which these policies will be effective, are both 
influenced by the political environment, particularly by the willingness of the 
elite of dominant ethnic groups to share power with minority ethnic groups (Akzin 
1 964:237-38), and by the availability of, and prospects for, access to alternative 
political arenas for minority groups.  The prospects for pluralist solutions to 
ethnic group conflicts are dim if the ideology of the elite does not transcend the 
boundaries of the major ethnic group, and if the subnational elite is not allowed 
access to elite positions and political power. 
The response of ethnic groups to elite policies is influenced by those 
policies, and the degree to which the ruling elite is perceived as legitimate. Some 
ethnic groups call for more participation in national decision-making; others 
call both for increased participation nationally and for more local autonomy; 
some are mainly concerned with maintaining or gaining a local autonomy. 
Those groups most alienated often call for the formation of a separate nation 
state (Wright 1975). 
The creation of Bangladesh is attributed to a variety of causes, such as 
foreign intervention, economic disparity, deprivation of political power, and 
racial distance. These issues, however, were all ensconced in the real problem 
that precipitated the internal crisis: the problem of national and political 
integration. 
In the pre- 197 1  period, the attentive elite in Pakistan seldom paid any 
attention to this problem facing the state. The attentive elite followed the theory 
of the Muslim League that Islam as a unifying force would take care of 
communalism. As a result, it was only in the post- 1 97 1  period that the attentive 
elite began to articulate and formulate integration strategies. 
Thus, in the case of Pakistan, the study of elite strategies for integration 
becomes critical. Ethnic differences or similarities per se do not necessarily lead 
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to Balkanization of a multi-ethnic state. The intervening variables that play a 
significant role are the strategies and policies of the governing elites, both at the 
national and regional levels. Thus, if the political system is considered the 
independent variable, a significant political success would be achieved by 
granting political autonomy, 30 separate political status within a sovereign state, 
or control over the educational process in public schools attended by members 
of the group. 31 
To conclude this discussion of ethnic integration, one must compare and 
contrast the military and civilian strategies implemented to achieve national 
integration in Pakistan. The civilian period of 197 1-77 under Bhutto featured a 
civilian elite government that attempted to develop a melange of socialist 
economics and Islamic religion. Under the vague title of ' Islamic socialism ',  the 
core elite emphasized pragmatic and popular conceptions of Islam as opposed 
to orthodox religious practices. The civilian elite had some initial successes, but 
Bhutto and the core elite consolidated power; it alienated the Muhajir, the 
Baluch and the Pathan who, like the Bengali, came to feel politically, eco­
nomically, and culturally alienated. Bhutto and his regime were quick to sense 
that people in post- 1971 Pakistan wanted a regime based on religious and 
development slogans- a state that emphasized fulfilment of mass needs: bread, 
clothing, shelter. Thus, Pakistan entered the populist period. 
After ensuring military support, the civilian elite put into effect its economic 
strategy. The Bhutto regime nationalized its industries, insurance companies, 
and banks; it instituted minimum wages, trade unions and worker participation 
in industry. In the agricultural sector, land reform was instigated that encour­
aged peasants to take land from landlords without compensation. Bhutto' s 
strategy attempted to build a mass coalition of workers, peasants, and students. 
Bhutto believed that he was the head and mind of the nation - a democracy in 
which all groups would be represented and involved in the development of a 
mature democratic structure. 
He accumulated power under this highly personalized rule. The civilian 
elite developed a highly effective police apparatus, the Federal Security Force 
(FSF),32 which was used to inflict severe punishment on Bhutto 's adversaries.  
Its brutality was unmatched in dealing with opposition parties and the press. 33 
But the political strategy towards minority provinces was most problematic 
in the Bhutto period. While the PPP commanded a comfortable majority at the 
federal level and in the more populous provinces of the Punjab and Sind, it had 
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an insignificant following in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
Baluchistan, the two minority provinces with volatile electorates and autono­
mist parties. No political party had obtained a clear majority in either of these 
provinces, but the National Awami Party (NAP) had won a plurality of votes in 
Baluchistan, and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) the largest number of seats in 
NWFP. 
This strategy produced a war in B aluchistan in which the centre used 
1 00,000 troops over three years to pacify Baluchistan. Moreover, once set into 
motion, the war in Baluchistan began to have its own logic, because prolonged 
warfare necessarily created the opportunity for revolutionary groups to assume 
positions of leadership in the Baluch national movement as a whole, and the 
military action was henceforth deemed necessary to prevent further radicalization 
of an essentially regional movement. 
The civilian elite pursued a policy of accommodation concerning language, 
allowing each province to decide its provincial language while retaining Urdu 
as the national language. Sindhi nationalist Sayid Ghulam Mustafa Shah, 
commenting on the language crisis, stated: 
Urdu has become a trick of politicians and economic aggressors. A 
superficial language alien to Pakistan was expected to inspire alle­
giance to the concept of Pakistan. In Pakistan, except for the Punjabi 
military, bureaucracy and the Muhajir community, Urdu is rejected 
by all provinces. It is a painful realization that the ruling elite with a 
Sindhi at the helm has accepted a tongue foreign to the people of 
Pakistan and declared it a national language, and worse still, equated 
it with patriotism and nationalism but used it as an instrument of 
oppression. subjection and fooling indigenous people of Pakistan 
(Sindh Quarter, I O[July] :2). 
When the provincial assembly of Sind declared Sindhi as the provincial 
language, it created problems for the centre. The declaration also directed that 
all civil servants would have to learn Sindhi within three months or be fired. This 
led to massive riots by the Muhajirs who spoke only Urdu, but who dominated 
the provincial bureaucracy. Karachi was paralyzed. The centre diffused the 
situation, facilitating a compromise between the Sindhis and the Muhajirs. 
In the absence of the NAP, Bhutto and his regime had little to fear from the 
remaining opposition parties.  Bhutto, however, did not count on the opposition 
parties forming themselves into the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for the 
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purposes of contesting the general election. Nor did he anticipate a concerted 
attack by Islamic parties. Bhutto was accused of anti-Islamic behaviour. The 
religious community declared jihad (holy war) against his rule. 
When the PPP won a massive victory in the 1977 general elections, the 
opposition insisted the results were fraudulent. The PNA demanded Bhutto' s  
resignation and called on the army to remove him. Bhutto refused to yield, 
unleashing the Federal Security Force on opposition parties, newspapers, 
lawyers and journalists. This policy led to civil riots in the major cities, a high 
death toll, and the flight of capital. The economy was paralyzed. Bhutto was 
eventually compelled to call out the army and declare martial law. 
Bhutto 's quest for personal power, the suppression of minorities and the use 
of military might to solve political problems led to the destruction of democracy, 
riots, and disaffection in the army. On 5 July 1977, Bhutto was arrested, and later 
executed. The PPP was banned and Pakistan's only freely elected civilian 
regime came to an ignominious end. 
Pakistan' s  civilian regime was corrupted by a single man's lust for power. 
Whereas most researchers promote populist regimes as the best possible ruling 
elite, the military tends to be the best. Their highly organized, egalitarian 
structure brings order. However, the military in Pakistan inherited a legacy of 
political decay. 
The advent of military rule in 1977 meant a shift from materialist socialism 
towards Islam as an integrating strategy. The construction of an Islamic nation 
characterized the post- 1977 period.34 The manipulation of lslam and coercion 
were the main integration strategies use by a predominantly Punjabi army to 
deny existence of separate nationalities within Pakistan. 
Crawford Young aptly describes authoritarian formulas: 
The military regimes offer a very different structure of access to poli­
tics. Incentives for cultural mobilisation by political entrepreneurs are 
removed; numbers per se are no longer the name of the game. Indeed, 
strong disincentives are likely to be part of the operating principles of 
such regimes through the banning of parties and ethnic associations, 
prohibition of communally oriented publication, and like measures 
(Young 1976:520). 
It was the need to save Pakistan that prompted the armed forces to act in 
1977. The military elite felt that political parties would lead to factionalism, and, 
eventually, to civil war. They viewed the armed forces as the only institution that 
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could transcend parochial issues and regional questions, represent the national 
interest, and foster integration. But as Young noted, ' [i]n the praise occasionally 
extended to military elites as national builders in the developing world, 
insufficient note is taken of the possibility of major inequalities in representation 
within the military elites' (ibid.). 
Islamic doctrine did not prevent the secession of East Pakistan, and it is an 
open question whether appeals to religion could prevent a further unravelling of 
Pakistan. However, Islam has proven successful in integrating different ethnic 
groups only in times of external threat. The disturbances that erupted in Sind in 
1 982 showed the difficulties that arise during the establishment of a centralized 
Islamic state. In addition, there were riots between Shi' ite and Sunni Muslims 
over property rights as well as over the government' s Islamic policy, which 
seemed to be more appropriate for the Sunni than for the Shi 'a. Bitterness 
between the sects had historic roots, and the riots reflected the ever-present 
nature of their dissatisfaction. The military used force to subdue the situation 
rather than to reconcile rival moral claims. 
At the provincial level, the military elite strategies alienated the Sind 
province and, to a lesser extent, Baluchistan. Of the four nationalities, the 
Sindhis and the Baluchis were for all practical purposes excluded from the 
structure of the state. Sindhis and Baluchis constituted one per cent of the armed 
forces and the bureaucracy. 35 
The Sindhis constitute roughly 25 per cent of the population and have little 
representation in the army or bureaucracy. Commercially, they are a small force, 
and worse, in their own province, they have a feeling of being taken over by the 
Punjabis and the Muhajirs. The population of Sind is now 49 per cent non­
Sindhi. 
In the last half of 1 982, there was considerable instability in Sind, verging 
on insurrection, precipitated by the military' s  announcement of a new political 
system. In the view of the military, the new political system was truer to Islamic 
precepts and practice than anything Pakistan had experienced. 36 
The major obstacle to integration is representation. Pakistan' s political 
history has been traumatic, and the fear persists in the military elite that any 
reduction in their authority will accelerate the disintegration that has already 
shredded the national fabric. Pakistanis, according to this logic, do not possess 
the cohesiveness that promotes accommodation and co-operation, and it is only 
the integrity and unity of the military that sustains the nation. 
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With this analysis in mind, several conclusions may be drawn from the 
Pakistani experience. This case suggests that both civilian and military elite 
strategies have been a dismal failure in Pakistan since 1 94 7.  
Pakistani elites, beginning with Jinnah, too often have relied on strategies 
for nation-building in terms of assimilation, which would come about through 
Islam and identification with the Pakistani state. The people of Pakistan, with 
the exception of the Muhajirs, have had great difficulty in transferring their 
provincial and ethnic loyalties 'to the symbols and institutions of the "new 
national entity"' (Esman 1 966:6 1 ). 
The Pakistani civil war in 1 97 1  and the war in B aluchistan in 1 973 
illustrated that a ' sense of community' or 'we feeling' (Deutsch 1 964a, 1 964b ; 
Deutsch et al. 1 966:2-4), a sentiment of 'Pakistaniness ' ,  did not develop. The 
Bengali elite had decided that they could not reach agreement with Punjabi elites 
and resolve common problems; the result was tragic. Punjabi elites attempted 
to coerce people to assimilate through large-scale force. 
The classic theorists of integration view this as a social process, and as the 
development of sentiment towards a national identity. 37 These theorists failed to 
address the following question: Was it possible for a state such as Pakistan 
which was characterized by deep and enduring ethnic cleavages and linguistic 
identities to maintain some form of political community even if provincial 
linguistic ethnic identities did not change ? These integration theorists presup­
posed that language, religion, or ethnic groups are homogeneous in values and 
orientations and that these orientations are unchanging. The Pakistani case 
suggests that there is considerable differentiation within ethnic and provincial 
groups in Pakistan along caste and tribal affiliations (see Coleman and Rosberg 
1 964; Laponce 1 974: 1 34-35;  Tull 1975; Nicholson 1948). The civil wars in 
Pakistan and Nigeria clearly illustrate that ethnic identities are far more 
persistent and dangerous than once thought. 
This discussion clearly shows that assimilation, through language and 
values consensus, led to the rise of Bengali, Baluch and Sindhi identities which 
themselves became strongly separatist in order to thwart the integration strat­
egies of the centre. If Pakistan does not disintegrate, Pakistani elites will have 
to develop sound integration strategies and come to terms with diversity.38 
Theorists of consociation and conflict reduction differ from earlier integra­
tionist theorists in important respects. Theorists of the social process approach 
argue that integration requires consensus and that social cleavages have to be 
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eliminated. They assume that a common core of values requiring assimilation 
would result in increasing identification with the 'nation-state' . Those con­
cerned with consociation and conflict reduction are more modest about goals 
and integration (Esman 1 973:49-78;  Nordlinger 1 972:73-87; Lijphart 1 968:3-
44, 1 969:207-25, 1 977:73-87; McRae 1 974; Daalder 1 974:604-2 1 ;  Young 
1 976; Enloe 1 973). Based on experience, they argue that it is necessary for 
heterogeneous states to live with ethnic cleavages and identities, rather than 
eradicate them through coercion and assimilation. These theorists ' central 
premise is that efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts must begin with the elites, 
in Pakistan' s  case, both provincial and national elites. They argue that elite 
agreement is required as an important step towards accommodation, especially 
because linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities will be difficult to change in the 
near future.39 Theories of consociation and conflict reduction tend to give 
considerable importance to formal institutions, such as federalism or propor­
tional representation.40 Arend Lijphart identifies four strategies for consocia­
tional democracy: (a) 'ground coalition' of all ethnic groups; (b) mutual veto in 
decision making; (c) ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain oppor­
tunities and offices; and ( d) ethnic autonomy, that is, federalism. 
In general, there can be no doubt that societies characterized by deep ethnic 
cleavages and political conflict need inter-ethnic elite cooperation and strate­
gies that can bring integration about. However, in the development of effective 
integration strategies, in Crawford Young' s words, 'leadership of exceptional 
ability, skill, and integrity is an absolute requisite of consociationalism. Nation 
building can only move forward through on-going consociational bargaining 
and compromise' (Young 1 976: 527). 
30 
Finally, Ali Jinnah's  words seem as appropriate today as they did in 1 948: 
There are great tasks to be accomplished and great danger to over­
come: overcome them we certainly shall, but we shall do so much 
quicker if our solidarity remains unimpaired and if our determination 
to march forward as a single united nation remains unshaken. This in 
the only way in which we can raise Pakistan rapidly and surely to its 
proper worthy place in the community of nations (Jinnah 1 960) . 
Notes 
For an elaborate discussion of cultural diversity, see Young ( 1976). 
2 Horowitz ( 1 985:3) states: 
Not so long ago, the proposition was advanced that increased political consciousness could 
be expected to consolidate the unity of states with homogeneous populations and "strain or 
destroy" the cohesion of states with diverse populations .. .it has become clear that few states 
are homogeneous and many are deeply divided. Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon. 
The evidence is abundant. The recurrent hostilities in Northern Ireland, Chad and Lebanon; 
secessionist warfare in Burma, Bangladesh, the Sudan, Nigeria, Iraq, and the Philippines; the 
Somali invasion of Ethiopia and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; the army killings in Uganda 
and Syria and the mass civilian killings in India-Pakistan, Burundi, and Indonesia; Sikh 
terrorism, Basque terrorism, Corsican terrorism, Palestinian terrorism; the expulsion of 
Chinese from Vietnam, of Arakanese Muslims from Burma, of Asians from Uganda, of 
Beninese from the Ivory Coast and Gabon; ethnic riots in India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Zaire, 
Guyana, and a score of other countries - these comprise only the most violent evidence of 
ethnic hostility. 
See also Schuman ( 1 966:28-40); Segall, Doornbos, and Davis ( 1946:87- 1 09); Morrison 
( 1 982:86); Paden ( 1 980); Tinker ( 1 968 : 125);  and Lebow ( 1 973: 1 22-25). 
3 Theorists of developed countries have been hard-put to account for the ethnic and racial 
conflicts that have created the wave of nationalist and separatist movements in advanced 
industrial states. For developing nations, conflicts are expected, and they are seen as part of 
the transition period. But after industrial society is firmly established, it is argued that such 
divisions will become residual, not systematic, or indeed intensifying contradiction (Marx 
1 957; Tonnies 1 957;  Weber 1 946: 1 80-95; Durkheim 1 947). 
4 For general theoretical literature, see Schemerhom ( 1 976); Enloe ( 1 973 :3 1 9-55); Achola 
( 1 98 1 :585-604); Lebow ( 1973 : 1 22-25); Brass ( 199 1 ); Moynihan ( 1 993). 
5 Nordlinger has argued that elites play a critical role in the process of conflict resolution. 
'They, and they alone, can make a direct and positive contribution. The presence among 
elites of certain motives for conflict regulation, conciliatory attitudes learned and reinforced 
over time, and the political security of top conflict group leaders are sufficient condition of 
conflict regulation behavior' (Nordlinger 1 972: 1 1 8 ) .  
6 An example of this phenomenon has occurred in Kashmir where approximately 70,000 
women were raped and many civilians murdered ( 'Troops Implicated in Kashmir Massacre' 
in Facts on File , 1 1 February 1 993, 53 (2724):90; 'Kashmir Strife Mounts; 1 2  Dead, Scores 
Hurt' (Battles Between Indian Troops and Militants in Jammu and Kashmir, India), The New 
York Times, 1 7  August 1993:4; see also 'The Case for the Rule of Law: Existing State of 
Unrest in Kashmir and Punjab, India' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August 1 99 1 :  24. 
3 1  
7 'I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amal­
gamated into a single state. An Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of 
Muslims.'( quoted in Weekes 1964:81). 
8 It should be pointed out that Muslim nationalism drew its strength not from the areas of 
major Muslim population concentration (which would later constitute Pakistan), but from 
Hindu areas where the Muslims were clearly in a minority (see Hodson 1969). 
9 For a distinction between Islam as a belief system and as a group identity, see Smith 
(1970: 161). 
10 Approximate populations of provinces in 1982 were: Punjab, 54 million; Sind, 20 million; 
NWFP, 18.6  million (including tribal areas ,  but excluding Afghan refugees); and 
Baluchistan, 5.25 million. Comparable figures for ethnic communities do not exist. Figmes 
calculated by using 1972 census data, and assuming 3 per cent annual growth rate per 
province (Government of Pakistan, Bureau of Census 1972; see also Harrison 1980). Total 
population estimates range from 88.5 million to 94.8 million (see Nyrop 1983). 
1 1  Shahid Javed Burki ( 1980:4) calculates that in 1977, the mean per capita income in the two 
richer provinces (Punjab and Sind) was 28 per cent higher than in the poorer provinces. 
12Jn 1977, the mean life expectancy in Baluchistan (rural), was 42 years, and in rural NWFP, 
44 years. Mean life expectancy in Punjab and Sind was 60 years (Pakistan Statistical Year­
book 1977) 
13 Jn 1977, there were 3,000 'registered factories' with over 20 employees in the Punjab. and 
2,889 in the Sind, while in the NWFP there were only 262, and in Baluchistan, 10 (Pakistan 
Statistical Division 1981 : 1-15). Similarly in 1977 of all 'establishments with 20 or more 
employees excluding defense establishments',  7,859 were found in Punjab, 2,673 in the 
Sind, 1 ,046 in NWFP, and 290 in Baluchistan (Pakistan. Report on Annual Establishment 
/1U[uiry. 1976-77 [ 1981]: 1 ). 
14 Useful overviews of the nationalities question are found in Ziring ( 1975:629, 644); Sayeed 
(1981); and Ayoob (1976: 149-69). 
15 Amitai Etzioni, however, develops an elaborate discussion of political unification. He 
identifies three kinds of integrative elements: coercive. utilitarian, and identitive, by which 
he means values or symbols built by educational and religious institutions, symbol creation, 
and other mechanisms. Also relevant are levels of cultural homogeneity, elite attitude, and 
the desired scope and sequence of governmental integration. A people's values will often 
relate also to issues of political participation, distributive justice, and use of force. The 
coercive, utilitarian, and identitive powers should not be viewed as separate and autonomous 
agents that coalesce and interact (Etzioni 1965: chap. 2). 
16 'Concepts are judged not by their truth or falsity, but by their theoretical utility.' This is a 
maxim, underscored by Holt and Richardson in their discussion of the nature and function of 
paradigms (1970:24). 
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17 For example, see Smock and Smock (1975). Although the Smocks make fifteen references to 
the problem associated with 'national integration', or the prospects of Ghana or Lebanon 
achieving it, the term is never defined. 
1 8 Tue term 'fallacy of the misplaced level' was coined by Frederick W. Frey (1970:290). 
19 Coleman and Rosberg (1964:9) define the integration process in two senses: 'territorial' 
integration quoted above, and 'political integration, which refers to the progressive bridging 
of the elite mass gap on the vertical plane'. 
20Tue two strands of democratic theory, often called conflict and consensus models, are 
illustrated in the writings of John Stuart Mill and James Madison. In Considerations on 
Representative Government, Mill sets forth his theory of the relationship between nationality 
and representative government. He argues that as a general principle, the boundaries of a 
government should coincide with nationality. A nationality is composed of people 'mtlted by 
common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others' .  This harmony of 
'feeling among people could be caused by identity of language, religion, race and geography; 
but the strangest of all is the identity of political antecedents' .  He concludes that in a country 
composed of different nationalities, popular government is not possible (Mill 1958:229-37). 
Although Mill stressed a pre-existing hannony among people as a -prerequisite for democ­
racy, Madison, in The Federalist Papers. No. JO, saw territorial expanse and governmental 
institutions as necessary and sufficient harmonizing influences. He emphasized that the 
proposed form of representative government to be inaugurated in the United States would 
provide the necessary equilibrium for the crosscutting interests that exist in the country. 
Noting that factions are a threat to the stability of a 'popular' government but that force is an 
unacceptable means of dealing with them, he maintained that the proposed form of federal 
government is the best way of controlling parochial interests, and moulding them into a 
national political consensus. Through selected representatives 'whose wisdom may best 
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least 
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations ', a common good is arrived at, that 
the central government can legislate and administer without recourse to coercion (Madison 
1961 :77-84). In Mill's theory, national consensus is the independent variable. In Madison's 
theory, it is the dependent variable. However, in both theories. some form of national 
political consensus is essential for the stability of the political system. 
21 The definitions of integration by Binder (1964), Coleman and Rosberg (1964) and Deutsch 
(1964a, 1964b) follow the assimilationist model. Integration is seen as a process of assimi­
lation of diverse groups. The pluralist model (sometimes referred to as the 'conflict model' or 
the 'equilibrium model') postulates that multiple group affiliations and crosscutting social 
cleavages reduce the importance of parochial identities with society, and thus produce a 
national, political culture or normative consensus. 'The multiple groups of individuals make 
for a multiplicity of conflicts crisscrossing society. Such segmental participation, then, can 
result in a kind of balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one axis' (Coser 
1964: 78-79; see also Lipset 1963: 70-78). 
33 
22 M.G. Smith expands Furnivall ' s  definition of plural society in The Plural Societv in the 
British West Indies ( 1974: 86): 'Given the fundamental differences of belief, value and or­
ganization that connote pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the 
essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form' .  
23 Crawford Young notes that 'in contemplating Nigeria and India in tandem, a parallel pattern 
is visible. Both polities went through a phase when the manifold lines of conflict became 
structured about a single code of confrontation. British India could not survive the 
superposition of its cleavages into the single Hindu-Muslim division. Reduction of Nigeria' s 
diversity to the Lapidary formula of Ibo-Yoruba-Hausa created a three-person game whose 
stakes of cultural anxiety were far too high. The political arena was then redefined by 
partition in India, by the creation of twelve states in the place of the original three regions in 
Nigeria. Cultural politics are thereby transformed and diffused. Not of course. eradicated; but 
the segmentation of conflict tends to encapsulate it, to contain its tensions at the periphery of 
the system. Nigeria and India offer the opportunity for a comparative exploration of the 
hypothesis that cultural complexity may play a positive role in national integration if the 
polity is so structured as to draw advantage from it' (Young 1 976: 275-76). 
24 Tue terms 'global environment' , 'external environment' ,  and 'international system' are used 
interchangeably. They are conceived in James Rosenau 's  terminology to consist of all 'the 
human and nonhuman phenomena that are located external to the geographic space of the 
society, of which the polity is a part' (Rosenau and Rosenau 1969:45 ). 
25 However, there has been a substantial amount of literature on non-democratic regimes in 
Africa and Latin America. See Young 1 976,;, Bienen 1968 ; Coleman and Rosberg 1964; 
Smock 1 97 1 ;  Luckham 1 97 1 ;  Clinton 1 97 1 :43-66. Corbett 1972:399-436; Milne 198 1 ;  and 
Fegely 1 978: 80-84. 
26 The two major exceptions to this being the use of force by the Indian Army against the Sikhs 
in 1 955 and Nagaland in the 1 970s (see Rajnayor 1 980:50-5 1 ). 
27 See the excellent study of military organization by Stanislav Andreski ( 197 1 ) .  
28 Four broad state-nation patterns are distinguished in Akzin ( 1 964, chap. 6) :  the ' integration­
ist' , 'pluralism on the basis of inequality' ,  'pluralism on the basis of equality' ,  and 
'secession' patterns. 
29 Sudan is a good example. The Sudanese leadership had to accept a pluralistic state structure 
when their integrative objectives proved unfeasible. 
30Tuis definition follows Akzin ( 1964:3 1 who stresses that a nation must exceed purely local 
dimensions. The size criterion distinguishes isolated villages or kinship groups, whose 
separateness arises from an absence of communication with other groups, rather than out of a 
self-conscious awareness of differences from other groups. 
3 1 See Akzin (ibid. : 1 33)  on the importance of control over the public schools in multi-ethnic 
societies generally. Also see Geertz ( 1 963: 1 25) .  
34 
32The FSF was used to silence opposition parties and leaders. Arrest. illegal imprisonment. 
kidnapping, rape and assassination of real and imagined enemies of the regime were common 
under civilian rule. Prominent opposition leaders known for their sharp criticism. such as 
Nazir Ahmed, Khawja Rafiqu Maului Shamsuddin, were assassinated during Bhutto's ten­
ure. Special tribunals were set up to try political prisoners; under the Defence of Pakistan 
Rules over 1 ,000 people were tried. 
33 Although the press had never been independent in Pakistan, whatever little freedom it 
enjoyed was greatly restricted by various legal and political manoeuvres such as the press 
publication ordinance and new print quotas. Publication of newspapers and periodicals was 
suspended without due process if they reported on meetings and speeches of opposition 
leaders. 
34The coercive strategy of the military elite was much more selective than that of the civilian 
elite. There were almost 50,000 political prisoners in gaol under the civilian regime; there 
were less than 500 political prisoners under the military. 
35 The least problematic in terms of its integration was the NWFP. The Pathan are by far the 
most integrated in Pakistan: they were well represented in the military and in the bureau­
cracy. Economically the province is well integrated. Seventy per cent of the volume of trade 
and income of the NWFP is with Punjab. 
36 India, too, has some bearing on Sindhi problems. It is probable that India had some role in 
Sind disturbances, if only in that the statements of India' s Gandhi and notions of democracy 
and self-determination gave some encouragement to Sindhi nationalists. 
37 The earlier literature on integration stressed assimilation and has a predisposition towards 
consensus and shared values. To achieve consensus social cleavages had to be eliminated, or 
neutralized (see Jacob and Teune 1 964: 5-6). 
38 since 1 947 Pakistani elites have viewed demands by ethnic groups as the 'poison of 
provincialism' . National elites have accused provincial elites of elevating the province over 
the country. 
39The major criticism of conflict reduction and consociational democracy is that it is based on 
a study of relatively small European states (Switzerland, Austria, Belgium. and the Nether­
lands) that have attained democracy and stability in spite of considerable heterogeneity. 
Their success is attributed to the success of elite cooperation that transcends the ethnic and 
. linguistic cleavages. Val R. Lorwin has argued 'that the European democracies differ 
significantly from polities in which there is a rigid cleavage of caste, tribalism, race, 
language. The 'spiritual families' into which these European polities are divided are not 
airtight as ascriptive groups are. Even where differences are ascriptive, as between language 
groups in Belgium and Switzerland. the main political parties are not organized along ethnic 
lines, and ethnic differences alternate and compete for attention with class, religious. and (in 
Switzerland) differences between cantons. Hostility is less intense towards members of other 
groups than in severely heterogeneous societies' (Lorwin 1974: 35). Horowitz argues ' that 
35 
the problem of cause and effect is most serious with those theories that generalize from 
European models to Asian or African models' (Horowitz 1973 : 1-6). 
40 Lijphart's  argument for consociationalism is the unsuitability for heterogeneous societies 
such as Pakistan of 'adversary' Anglo-American democratic institutions. This point is well 
illustrated in the period 197 1 -77 (Lijphart 1977:25-44). 
36 
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